USGS2025
Executive Summary The purpose of this Wake Atoll Vessel Movement Biosecurity Program Efficacy document is to provide the United States Air Force (USAF) with an unbiased review of the current (2015; hereafter referred to as the 2015 Biosecurity Plan) biosecurity plan for the military base Wake Island Airfield (WIA) on Wake Atoll (hereafter Wake). Periodic reviews are an integral step for evaluating plan efficacy and updating plans with new information for improving plan effectiveness. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) acted as an external expert to provide the first unbiased assessment of the program and observe how it was being implemented. The USAF 2015 Wake Island Biosecurity Management Plan goes beyond sea vessel and container biosecurity; however, those aspects were not included in this evaluation. We used several methods for a quality assurance evaluation of the 2015 sea vessel and shipping container biosecurity program specified in the Biosecurity Plan. Our evaluation included real-time observations in Hawai`i and at Wake. We surveyed cargo staging areas and empty shipping containers before supply shipment and the containers, barge, and marina at Wake after shipment. We used various detection tools and techniques (for example, visual encounter surveys, glue boards, chew cards, camera traps, and so on). We carried out an insect mortality experiment trial using one of the required shipping container biosecurity tools (dichlorvos impregnated pest strips). We also included a table-top review of documentation (largely the 2015 Biosecurity Plan) with respect to our observations to provide an assessment of how well the Biosecurity Plan protocols were carried out and how well they serve their intended purpose. We observed biosecurity concerns in each focal area and stage of cargo handling (before and after barge movement) across all surveys of containers, flat racks, break bulk, warehouses, and dock areas. Using visual inspections, we recorded biosecurity concerns for every empty container we inspected before it was to be stuffed with cargo. Most containers had structural integrity issues (such as holes and damaged floorboards) and sanitation concerns, including live animals and plant matter or seeds. About one third of the containers had mold and a few had wet floorboards or standing water. We detected live animals on the break bulk, and flat racks were in poor condition. Next, we inspected cargo staging areas and noted extensive permeability of the building where cargo was staged for the 2018 resupply shipment and the building that had typically been used. We included the adjacent dock area used for staging break bulk, shipping containers and mooring the barge. We detected more than 5,000 individuals of 105 species. We also detected seeds in each location and scattered vegetation in the dock area, including growing in from the area outside separated by a chain link fence. During surveys at Wake, we observed that 100 percent of the shipping containers, including all containers sent with required biosecurity tools, had live animals. The barge had only one unsecured snap trap for intercepting rodents aboard, we saw areas with fairly deep layers of dirt (or soil; we did not examine it to determine its properties), and there was plant matter with seed heads on the barge gangway that could easily be transported onto the barge. There was also only one snap trap station that was improperly placed on the dock. We also observed piled wood and vegetation nearby that could provide refuge to potential stowaway animals escaping. Combined, surveys of the containers, staging areas, barges, and receiving area in Hawai`i and at Wake resulted in detection of more than 9,000 individuals of 131 animal species; nearly 4,000 individuals of 62 species were detected in surveys of containers once they had arrived at Wake. None of the species identified are known to be native to Wake. Our preliminary risk analysis of all species detected included eight species that we scored as high risk of potentially negative effects to biodiversity, infrastructure, or human health should they arrive at Wake and become established. Six of these species were only recorded using tools not clearly required by the Biosecurity Plan or being used to implement the plan. We observed that the required biosecurity tools intended to intercept animals in the cargo staging area did not target the suite nor number of species present. Our analysis also indicated the required biosecurity tools intended to intercept animals in shipping containers were inadequate to handle the volume of organisms that were in the containers. The insect mortality trial experiment showed the pest strips were highly effective for only one of the three species tested, leaving uncertainty about how effective they are across the suite of potential species stowing away in cargo and containers. Base Operating Support (BOS) did not carry out all Biosecurity Plan actions, but we also noted the document uses terminology such as “recommendation” as opposed to “requirement” which may lead contractors to consider those actions as optional. However, USAF provided evidence of BOS training and follow up; this included detailed identification of specific requirements for some of the biosecurity actions that we did not observe being carried out. The 2015 Biosecurity Plan contains critical and useful components that seem to be well carried out. However, we also saw discrepancies, weaknesses, or both across methods and protocols currently used for Wake Atoll biosecurity. We observed shortcomings at each stage of our survey as well as in the plan as written, and we suggest general modifications to the Biosecurity Plan for consideration to potentially strengthen biosecurity overall. Prevention is the most efficient and cost-effective biosecurity measure. Based on our findings, we see possible solutions to improve existing preventative biosecurity efforts and reduce potential incursion at Wake. These potential solutions include creating and implementing the following: Minimum cargo staging area sanitation and permeability standards, Minimum shipping container integrity and sanitation standards, Stand-alone inspection protocols, Inspection checklists, Monitoring protocols, Accountability reporting, Horizon scanning for prioritizing and targeting species of highest concern, Expansion of educational materials and outreach, Schedules for biosecurity plan reviews and updates Management of invasive species enhances capability to protect human health and the environment as well as to advance mission accomplishment. Biosecurity plans are an integral component for addressing invasive species. Periodic evaluation of the efficacy of these plans is useful for identifying elements that are working well and for illuminating those that can be improved. Evaluations encourage consideration of new tools and adaptation of processes to achieve better outcomes and accommodate potential future threats more efficiently and more cost effectively.